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Abstract
Though still in its infant stages, the process of establishing the Sinuiju Special Administrative
Region and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex heralds a tremendous paradigm shift on the part
of North Korea. This Essay will seek to analyze the comprehensive legal structure that North
Korea has adopted for these regions. It will seek to offer a glimpse into the future of how North
Korea will establish similar economic zones throughout the country and, eventually, a market-
based economic system across the entire country. This Essay will first offer an overview of the
impetus behind North Korea’s efforts to develop Sinuiju and Gaeseong. Next, it will offer an
analysis of the recently adopted laws and regulations covering Sinuiju and Gaeseong. The Essay
will then try to forecast what types of problems can be envisaged under the current regime and
will conclude with some potential recommendations.
THE CHALLENGES OF ATTRACTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INTO NORTH
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INTRODUCTION
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") t re-
mains one of the most controversial, secluded, and potentially
dangerous countries in the world. Its geo-strategic location be-
tween South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia magnifies the Na-
tion's significance. In recent years, however, North Korea has
made bold attempts to embrace international market practices
by establishing four special economic zones in the four corners
of the country. Through Rajin-Seonbong in the northeast,
Sinuiju in the northwest, and most recently Gaeseong in the
southwest and Geumgang Mountain in the southeast, North Ko-
rea appears to be desperately trying to attract foreign investment
and much needed hard currency in an effort to jumpstart its
economy.2 Instead of adopting a single law to cover all four re-
gions, DPRK chose to promulgate individual laws for each city.
Reports indicate that North Korea has even established a Special
Economic Zone Development Office underneath the cabinet.'
Despite previous setbacks in Rajin-Seonbong, plans to estab-
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1. This Essay will alternatively use both DPRK or North Korea, and the Republic of
Korea ("ROK") or South Korea.
2. See Geumgangsan GwangwangJigubeop [Geumgang Mountain Tourism Zone
Law], Nov. 13, 2002 [hereinafter Geumgangsan Law]; Sinuiju Teukbyeol Haengje-
onggu Gibonbeop [Basic Law of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region], Sept. 12,
2002 [hereinafter Sinuiju Law]; Gaeseong Gongeop Jigubeop [Gaeseong Industrial
Zone Law], Nov. 20, 2002 [hereinafter Gaeseong Law]. The Geumgangsan Law closely
follows the Gaeseong Law in most of its major provisions. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
BuiKHAN "GAESEONG GONGEOP JIGUBEOP" BUNSEOK [AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREA's
"GAESONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE LAw"] 61-72 (S. Kor. May 2003) [hereinafter MOJ] (Com-
paring the Geumgangsan Law and the Gaeseong Law). Gaeseong is alternatively spelled
as "Kaesong."
3. DONG Ho CHO, KOREA DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, BUKHAN GYEONGJEJUNGCHAEKUI
BYEON JEONMANGGWA NAMBUKGYEONGHYEOPI YEOKHAL [THE PROSPECTS OF CHANGE IN
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lish a special region in Sinuiju and Gaeseong in particular, re-
present North Korea's most daring moves to date. In June 2003,
North Korea also successfully commenced the development of
an industrial park in Gaeseong, the heart of the Korean penin-
sula. An unprecedented array of legal infrastructure is being es-
tablished in Gaeseong through comprehensive negotiations with
counterparts in the Republic of Korea ("ROK"). At the same
time, the original plans to develop Sinuiju, which borders China
and can serve as a gateway for inter-regional trade, still appear to
be under close consideration.
Though still in its infant stages, the process of establishing
the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region and the Gaeseong In-
dustrial Complex heralds a tremendous paradigm shift on the
part of North Korea. This Essay will seek to analyze the compre-
hensive legal structure that North Korea has adopted for these
regions. It will seek to offer a glimpse into the future of how
North Korea will establish similar economic zones throughout
the country and, eventually, a market-based economic system
across the entire country.
This Essay will first offer an overview of the impetus behind
North Korea's efforts to develop Sinuiju and Gaeseong. Next, it
will offer an analysis of the recently adopted laws and regulations
covering Sinuiju and Gaeseong. The Essay will then try to fore-
cast what types of problems can be envisaged under the current
regime and will conclude with some potential recommenda-
tions.
I. NORTH KOREA ATTEMPTS TO ACCESS THE MARKETS
North Korea's economy has gradually collapsed during the
past decade. Between 1990 and 1998 alone, the Nation suffered
nine consecutive years of negative economic growth.4 A signifi-
cant part of DPRK's economic problems can be attributed to its
deteriorating trade environment. Until the late 1980s, for in-
stance, the former Soviet Union was North Korea's largest trad-
ing partner, accounting for more than 53% of its trade. At this
NORTH KOREA's ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ROLE OF SOUTH-NORTH ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION] 146 (2003).
4. KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY ["KIEP"], POLICY PAPER
02-26, BuKaA GYEONGJE BAEKSEO [hereinafter NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC WHITE PAPER]
521 (2002).
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time, former socialist countries as a whole accounted' for over
72% of North Korea's trade. By 1991 and 1992, however, former
Eastern Europe, China and the former Soviet Union ended their
barter trade and shifted to hard currency systems, particularly in
their trading relations with the DPRK Most notably, by 1991
Russia represented only 14% of North Korea's trading volume
and by 2001 its share dropped to a paltry 3%.5
Against this backdrop, during the past decade, North Korea
attempted to rejuvenate its struggling economy by attracting
trade and investment. The promulgation of the Joint Venture
Law [Hapyeongbeop] in September 1984, the establishment of the
first special zone in Rajin-Seonbong in 1993, and the adoption of
various foreign investment-related laws represent DPRK's initial
attempts to access international markets. 6 Other potential
means to promote investment in North Korea include public
and commercial loans, the issuance of foreign bonds and project
finance.7 Most of these prior efforts, however, failed miserably
due to a host of factors ranging from the on-going nuclear crisis,
general mismanagement, poor understanding of international
markets, structural problems, geographic limitations, and even
the financial contagion that ravaged Asia.'
Hoping to attract international attention and to learn from
its mistakes, DPRK has boldly attempted to revamp its approach
to foreign investment through its projects in Sinuiju and Gaese-
ong. With great fanfare, in the fall of 2002, North Korean lead-
ers chose a foreigner, Bin Yang, as chief administrator of the
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region. This appointment signi-
fied a bold attempt by the isolated communist regime to reform
its crippled economy and demonstrate its commitment to
change. As a Dutch national and one of the wealthiest persons
of Chinese descent, Yang was a daring choice by DPRK to head
its first major effort at attracting foreign capital. DPRK perhaps
5. NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 491.
6. Contrary to DPRK's difficulties, China has been tremendously successful after
passing its Chinese-Foreign EquityJoint Ventures Law in 1979. See George White, Enter
the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and Policy in the P.RC., 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 35, 36 (2003); see also Bin Xue Sang, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone In
China?, 14 NW.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1993).
7. See HWON IL PARK, HYUNDAI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DAEBUK TUJASAEOBE ISSEOSEO
HYOGWAJEOGIN OEJAYUCHI BANGAHN [EFFECTIVE WAYS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL IN
NORTH KOREAN INVESTMENT PROJECTS] 163-77 (1999).
8. See NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 516-21.
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hoped Yang could attract Chinese investment and the attention
of the European market, critical for Sinuiju's success. Yet, for
unconfirmed reasons, the Chinese government subsequently ar-
rested Yang for bribery, tax evasion, and other offenses, and sen-
tenced him to a stiff penalty of eighteen years of imprisonment.9
North Korea's interest in Sinuiju reportedly remains fervent de-
spite this unfortunate turn of events.' ° It has been reported that
Seung-hae Kye, former chair of North Korea's Committee for
the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation ("CPEEC"),
has been acting as the interim head since July 2003.
While the Sinuiju Region is targeting Chinese investment,
Gaeseong and Geumgang are primarily seeking South Korean
investment. In August 2000, Hyundai Asan, a private company,
achieved a dramatic breakthrough when it entered into a his-
toric agreement with North Korea to develop Gaeseong Indus-
trial Park." Despite this initial progress, however, the project
encountered a host of roadblocks due to the war against terror, a
skirmish in the Yellow Sea between DPRK and ROK naval forces
and Hyundai Asan's financial troubles. North Korea's acknowl-
edgment of its attempts to develop nuclear rods further dealt a
severe blow to the project.
On November 20, 2002, North Korea nevertheless promul-
gated the Gaeseong Industrial Zone Law. Groundbreaking cere-
monies for the zone took place on June 30, 2003. Comprehen-
sive implementing provisions for the Law in the form of the De-
velopment Regulations, Company Establishment and
Management Regulations, Tax Regulations, Labor Regulations,
Establishing and Operation Regulations for the Management Of-
fice, Entry, Visiting and Residency Regulations, and Customs
Regulations were later passed in June, October, and December
of 2003.12 Furthermore, in November 2003, the South-North Ec-
9. See Karby Leggett, Economic Crimes Fell Chinese Entrepreneur, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
July 15, 2003, at Al (discussing the speculation surrounding the reason behind China's
harsh treatment of Yang and its apparent disapproval of the Sinuiju Region); see also
Hyun Tae Cho, Bukhanui Gaehyeokgaebangae Daehan Junggukui Sigak [China Viewpoint on
North Korea's Reform and Opening], 76 CURRENT ISSUES AND POLICY (Sejong Institute, Se-
oul, S. Kor.), Nov. 1, 2002, at 8.
10. See Cho, supra note 9, at 146.
11. See Gongeopjigu Geonseolunyeonge Gwanhan Hapuiseo [Agreement on the
Construction and Management of the Industrial District], in MOJ, supra note 2, at 99-
100.
12. See Gaebal Gyujeong [Development Regulations] and Gieop Changdal
1310 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1306
onomic Cooperation Promotion Committee announced that a
Direct Trade Office would be established within the District by
early 2004.13 A preliminary district of 33,000 to 66,000 square
meters (10,000 to 20,000 pyung) will be allotted in late 2004. On
December 23, 2002, Hyundai was also granted a Land Use Per-
mit for 66 million square meters (20 million pyung) in the Gaese-
ong Zone. In January 2003, over 900 South Korean companies
in the textiles, clothing, machinery, metal, and electronic indus-
tries expressed interest in entering the Gaeseong project. 4
Overall, North Korea has a dire need to ensure that Sinuiju
and Gaeseong are successful. It has thus set into motion a vari-
ety of important initiatives to develop Sinuiju and Gaeseong.
Among these structural moves, the most significant are the legal
reforms that it has adopted in the process.
II. A NOVEL UNDERTAKING TO ATTRACT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: THE SINUIJU SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION ("SSAR")
The recent adoption of special economic zone laws relating
to Sinuiju and Gaeseong represent the most significant legal de-
velopment to attract foreign capital. The Sinuiju region, in par-
ticular, accounts for 80% of North Korea and China's trade and
stands as the critical border city between the two Nations. 5 One
reason Sinuiju was chosen after Rajin-Seonbong is because it re-
mains equally distant and remote from the heart of the coun-
Unyeong Gyujeong [Company Establishment and Management Regulations], June 28,
2003, KDI REVIEW OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY, July 2003, at 59-68; Segeum Gyuje-
ong [Tax Regulations] and Nodong Gyujeong [Labor Regulations], Sept. 18, 2003, KDI
REvIEW OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY, Oct. 2003, at 40-63; Gwanli Gigwan Seollip
Unyeong Gyujeong [Establishing and Operation Regulations for the Management Of-
fice], Chulip, Cheryu Geoju Gyujeong [Entry, Visiting and Residency Regulations],
Segwan Gyujeong [Customs Regulations], KDI REVIEW OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECON-
omy, Dec. 2003, at 3-23.
13. See NambukJikgyoyeok Samuso Naenyeonjung Gaeseonge Gaeseolkiro [Establishment of
a South North Direct Trade Office Next Year], CHOsUN ILBO, Nov. 8, 2003.
14. Jong Woon Lee, Gaeseong Gongeop Danjiui Baljeon Ganeungseonggwa Hyanghu
Gwaje [Development Potential of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Future Issues], SECYE
GYEONGJE [WORLD ECON.] (KIEP, S. Kor.), Nov. 2003, at 50 n.6.
15. Jong Woon Lee, Sinuiju Jiyeogui Saneop Hyeonhwanggwa Gyeonge Teukgu Seong-
gongui Gwaje [Industry Status of the Sinuiju Region and Issues in the Success of the Special
Economic Zone], SEGYE GYEONGJE [WORLD ECON.] (KIEP, S. Kor.), Nov. 2002, at 39.
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try.' 6 Under this rationale, the DPRK remains wary of the undue
influence such special regions might have upon the country, par-
ticularly from a security and ideological perspective.
Nevertheless, given its significance as a potential conduit for
trade and investment, North Korea passed the Basic Law of the
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region in September 2002. The
Sinuiju Law was unprecedented in many regards. For instance,
the Sinuiju Law established a "one country-two system" type of
regime that has been described as a "Hong Kong-style" adminis-
trative zone. 7 In fact, from its use of the name "Special Admin-
istrative Region" for the governing law, North Korean law-mak-
ers clearly paid close attention to the Hong Kong Law when
adopting their own version."' Many provisions directly follow
the dictates of the Hong Kong Law in terms of format, structure
and even wording.
As testimony to its independence, the Sinuiju Law resem-
bles a mini-constitution in its structure and content. First, the
law is structured according to the broad themes of politics, eco-
nomics, culture, rights and duties of residents, organizations and
the flag and emblem of the region. This structure closely follows
the Hong Kong Law. The first chapter grants independent legis-
lative, executive and judicial authority to the Region." Aside
from special examples such as Hong Kong or Macao, this type of
wholesale independence for the legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches is rare for a special economic zone.2" Article 6 also
stipulates that the DPRK's cabinet, executive committee, office
and central organization cannot participate in the Region. Fur-
thermore, if these types of central government institutions want
to send their staff to the Region, they must obtain permission
from the Minister. This non-interference provision seeks to ad-
16. Deok Ryong Yoon, Sinuiju CyeongjeteukguuiJeonmang [ The Prospects of the Sinuiju
Special Economic Zone], CURRENT ISSUES & POL'Y 7 , 76 Sejong Inst., Nov. 2002.
17. MOJ, supra note 2, at 24; Ihk Pyo Hong, Sinuiju Gyeongie Teukgu Seollip Bae-
geong Mit Hyanghu Baljeon Gwaje [Background of the Establishment of the Sinuiju Special
Economic Zone and the Issues for the Future], WORLD ECON. UPDATE (KIEP, S. Kor.), Oct. 1,
2002, at 13; Yoon, supra note 16, at 5.
18. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, 29 I.L.M. 1511 [hereinafter Hong Kong Law]; see also Michael C.
Davis, From British Colony to Chinese Special Administrative Region, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 157 (1997).
19. Lee, supra note 15, at 46 n.3.
20. Hong, supra note 17, at 1.
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dress the previous complaints that the central government was
overly meddlesome in the affairs of Rajin-Seonbong.
On its face, several aspects of Sinuiju's legal regime appear
more liberal than that of Hong Kong. In the case of military
troops for instance, Sinuiju allows the stationing of troops only
"when necessary." By contrast, Hong Kong does not have such a
condition on stationing troops but instead requires that military
forces "shall not interfere in the local affairs."21 With regard to
top administrative positions, Hong Kong limits the position of
Chief Executive to Chinese nationals that are older than forty
and that have resided in Hong Kong for at least twenty years.2 2
By comparison, the Sinuiju Law only requires that the person be
a resident and a person with "business competence and one held
in high regard by the residents. ' 23 Hence, Bin Yang, who was
thirty nine and a Dutch national at the time of his appointment,
would not have qualified as a candidate in Hong Kong.
Sinuiju's Minister has even more power than Hong Kong's
Chief Executive in certain regards. For example, the Minister
can hire or fire almost all personnel at his or her discretion. 24
The Minister acts as the head of the executive branch and as the
head of the Region. While the Minister is appointed and can be
terminated by the Supreme People's Congress' Executive Com-
mittee, the Minister's term is unspecified. By contrast, the Hong
Kong Chief Executive can only nominate or recommend the se-
nior positions for appointment or removal by the central govern-
ment in Beijing. 25 The Sinuiju Law allows the Region to carry
out independent consular affairs and even to issue its own pass-
26ports. Similarly, Sinuiju, like Hong Kong, allows the use of its
own flag and emblem. These are all truly novel features, given
that North Korea is considered to be one of the most totalitarian
Nations left.
The governing structure of the Region provides that the
Legislative Assembly will consist of fifteen persons, who will each
serve five-year terms. These members are in charge of enacting
laws and overseeing the executive branch and the Minister. For-
21. Sinuiju Law, art. 7; Hong Kong Law, art. 14.
22. Hong Kong Law, art. 44.
23. Sinuiju Law, art. 77.
24. Id. art. 79.
25. Hong Kong Law, art. 48.
26. Sinuiju Law, art. 8.
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eigners in the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region are not only
eligible to obtain junmingweon [residency rights], but can also
become legislative members of the Assembly. 27 Theoretically,
the entire Sinuiju Legislative Assembly could consist of foreign-
ers. Whereas in Hong Kong, the participation of foreigners is
limited to no more than 20% of the Assembly's composition. 28
Under Sinuiju Law, the Region independently establishes its
own judicial branch and prosecutor's office. The Minister ap-
points the head of the prosecutor's office from among the Re-
gion's residents to a five-year term. 29 The various fights and du-
ties of the prosecutor's office are outlined in Sinuiju Law. For
instance, prosecutors are expressly charged with the duty to "en-
force the law," "investigate crimes and issue indictments." By
contrast, Hong Kong Law only provides only a general statement
regarding the prosecutors' responsibilities. The Department of
Justice "controls all criminal prosecution free from any interfer-
ence."30 No further elaboration is provided."'
Sinuiju has a simpler set of provisions concerning the judici-
ary than Hong Kong. The independence of the Sinuiju's judici-
ary is guaranteed with it remaining separate from the executive
branch. Sinuiju Law provides for one level of appeal, however,
the final stage of judicial review is conducted by the court of the
Region, granting it substantial autonomy. Furthermore, the
three branches of government in the SSAR are independent of
one another.
The authority to interpret the law, however, lies with the
Supreme People's Congress Executive Committee. This can cre-
ate problems if conflicts arise. 33 This structure appears to be an-
other adaptation of Hong Kong Law that provides, "[t] he power
of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing
27. Id. art. 62.
28. Id. art. 62; Hong Kong Law, art. 67.
29. Sinuiju Law, arts. 85-90.
30. Hong Kong Law, art. 63.
31. For a comprehensive review of Hong Kong's Department of Justice, see The
Statement of Prosecution Policy and Practice, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/justice/
new/depart (Oct. 2002).
32. Hong, supra note 17, at 13.
33. Sinuiju Law, app., art. 3; Soon Jick Hong, Sinuiu TeukguJijeongui Uimiwa Seong-
gong Yogeon [The Meaning and Conditions for Success of Designating Sinuiju a Special
Economic Zone], Hyundai Research Institute, VIP Report, Oct. 1, 2002, at 2.
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Committee of the National People's Congress. '34 At the same
time, Article 3 of the Sinuiju Law stipulates that the Law will re-
main unchanged for the next fifty years. This provision seeks to
guarantee stability and predictability of the regulatory frame-
work.
In terms of economic affairs, SSAR has adopted many fea-
tures found in classic market economies, such as the quasi-pri-
vate ownership of property. One of the most sensitive issues in a
socialist system such as the DPRK is the ownership of real estate.
This essential property right remains with the State. Neverthe-
less, the new Law grants real estate rights pertaining to develop-
ment, usage and management, and also provides for leasing and
use.35 This grant further stipulates that land can be leased until
2052 and the right of hereditary succession to "privately owned
property" is equally guaranteed. 6 These features are essential in
attracting long-term foreign investment.
Furthermore, the Law protects foreign investors within the
SSAR by providing that the State can only expropriate privately
owned property "for the purposes of the [N]ation's safety," and
by requiring that the State must compensate the owner. 7 This
provision seeks to provide the most important assurance to for-
eign investors, but its protections should be expanded. For in-
stance, the circumstances and processes surrounding expropria-
tion and guidelines for determining the appropriate compensa-
tion should be spelled out in greater detail.
SSAR has strict provisions governing labor standards. La-
borers, for example, must be at least sixteen years old and may
work a maximum of eight hours per day or forty-eight hours per
week.38 Companies located within the Region must use North
Korean laborers and may only use foreign laborers with ap-
proval from the Region's Executive Office.39 While this remains
a thorny issue, DPRK should still consider liberalizing this strict
provision if it wants to enhance labor flexibility and encourage
foreign investment.
Overall, the Law provides for an independent budget pol-
34. Hong Kong Law, art. 158.
35. Sinuiju Law, arts. 12, 14.
36. Id. arts. 15, 17.
37. Id. art. 17.
38. Id. art. 18.
39. Id. art. 20.
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icy, currency policy, fiscal policy, and financial policy, as well as
free repatriation and transfer of foreign currency, tax benefits,
tariff benefits, free occupational movement of labor, and proof
of origin.4" In terms of currency, Sinuiju has made another bold
move by designating U.S. dollars and Chinese reminbi as the offi-
cial currencies. This marks a significant advance from the origi-
nal Rajin-Seonbong region where only DPRK currency could be
circulated and corporate transactions were limited to DPRK cur-
rency or certain convertible currency.4'
Finally, the Sinuiju Law governing the SSAR also has a de-
tailed chapter related to culture that addresses the arts, medical
insurance, education, childcare, and sports. Unlike Gaeseong,
Sinuiju also provides for freedom of religion, press, publication,
assembly and gathering.42
Despite this revolutionary legal framework, it remains ques-
tionable whether the SSAR can ever succeed without the devo-
tion of adequate resources. Furthermore, Sinuiju cannot suc-
ceed without critical support from China. China's Dandong re-
gion offers the basic infrastructure, such as electricity,
transportation, raw materials and even consumer demand, that
Sinuiju desperately needs in order to develop. Chinese political
support and economic cooperation in the form of investment
and trade are critical to bring about serious change. South Ko-
rea's potential interest remains secondary given its distance and
lack of initiative, especially with the development of Gaeseong.
III. THE ULTIMATE TEST IN OPENING NORTH KOREA:
THE GAESEONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE
Gaeseong offers an array of potential benefits, especially
when compared to the initially stalled attempts to establish spe-
cial economic zones in Rajin-Seonbong and Sinuiju. First, its
central location has tremendous strategic value and market po-
tential. Some of Rajin-Seonbong's critical weaknesses were its re-
mote location, limited population and lack of infrastructure. It
remained distant from any major economic centers or markets.4
As a result, transportation was inadequate and trade volume in-
40. Id. arts. 23-27.
41. Hong, supra note 17, at 8.
42. Sinuiju Law, art. 45.
43. Yoon, supra note 16, at 7.
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sufficient. Although not as pronounced, Sinuiju shared many of
these limitations, especially when considered from South Ko-
rea's perspective. Gaeseong, by contrast, can benefit from one
of the most lucrative consumer markets in the region and a
wealth of resources resulting from its close proximity to down-
town Seoul. Seoul, with its exorbitant real estate prices and mar-
ket demand, stands only sixty kilometers away.
The designation of Gaeseong as a special district therefore
has "special meaning" because of its geographic benefits.4 4 It
also represents a special "industrial zone" and therefore can be
distinguished from the prior attempts in Sinuiju or Rajin-Se-
onbong.4
Second, North Korea has delegated the ROK's Korea Land
Corporation as the main concessionaire of the Gaeseong project
and Hyundai Asan, a private entity, as the main contractor for
the initial plot of land development. 46 The DPRK has attempted
to grant them sufficient independence. First stage land surveys
and soil analysis were completed in July and August 2003. The
developers will have the option to transfer or delegate the actual
construction to others, or they may pursue the projects them-
selves. North Korea has also agreed to guarantee human re-
sources, materials and water.
To overcome the general skepticism that has developed
over the years toward North Korea's efforts at reform, experts
believe that "path-breaking policies and systems" must be
adopted.4 7 Along these lines, the legal structure of the Gaese-
ong Law has a fundamentally different approach when com-
pared to the Sinuiju Law. The Gaeseong Law primarily focuses
on the development of the industrial zone, investment and es-
tablishment of companies. As of yet, the Gaeseong industrial
zone does not have the independent legislative, executive and
judicial branches that were prominently featured in the Sinuiju
Special Administrative Zone. Article 1 of the Gaeseong Law pro-
44. Lee, supra note 14, at 45.
45. Some argue that due to many similarities the Gaeseong Law and Geumgangsan
Law should be combined under a single law. See MOJ, supra note 2, at 25.
46. Jong Hun Choe, Gaeseong Gongdan Saeopeun Nambuk Modu Winwin Kadeu
[Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a Win Win Situation for Both the South and North],
HANKVOREH SHINMUN, Nov. 19, 2003.
47. Lee, supra note 15, at 45.
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vides that North Korean Law specifically applies to the entire
zone.
In terms of the governance structure of Gaeseong, a Re-
gional Management Organization will be in charge of general
management and administration of the Zone.48 The Gaeseong
Law also tries to address persistent complaints that arose in the
case of Rajin-Seonbong like that of excessive interference by
North Korean officials in business operations. 49 As in the case of
Sinuiju, the Gaeseong Law has stipulated that administrative
agencies cannot interfere in business affairs.5 ° The DPRK gov-
ernment must guarantee an independent operating environ-
ment for foreign businesses.
The Gaeseong Law has a host of market-oriented features
related to price mechanism and ownership. Article 40 of the
Law, for example, recognizes that prices for goods can be set at
international market prices according to the agreement of the
parties involved. In terms of property rights, the Gaeseong Law
also follows the Sinuiju Law and allows that real estate may be
leased for a period of fifty years. The term, however, is not sub-
ject to automatic renewal but a request must be filed."' This
condition remains comparable to similar provisions in other
North Korean laws but in the future, more "automaticity" should
be considered in the renewal process. If an investment is
stopped or retracted, it is unclear to what extent a right to re-
claim the investment or to receive compensation might exist.
The Gaeseong Law notably has much more strict terms with
regard to potential State expropriation of property, compared to
the Sinuiju Law that was relatively less defined. Article 7 of the
Gaeseong Law in fact clearly provides that expropriation must
occur with "prior consultation" with the investor and can only
happen in inevitable cases related to "social communal inter-
ests." This represents a much tougher standard to meet relative
to Sinuiju's.
Perhaps, one of the most subtle but revolutionary changes
in Gaeseong from the perspective of adopting market practices
is that the zone law specifically allows advertising.5 2 All types of
48. Gaeseong Law, art. 21.
49. Lee, supra note 15, at 46, 53.
50. Gaeseong Law, art. 6.
51. Id. art. 12.
52. Id. art. 31.
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advertising are permitted regardless of location, type, content
and manner; one exception is that outside advertising must be
approved by the Zone's Management Office.
In terms of currency, the present law holds that the circulat-
ing currency within the Zone should be convertible currency
and even allows for credit cards.53 Circulating currency, how-
ever, is designated as "foreign currency," which suggests that
ROK currency cannot be used.54 Given that the predominant
portion of investment will be coming from South Korea, the im-
plementing provisions should consider clarifying this point to
permit ROK currency. The currency provision therefore ap-
pears less liberal than the comparable provision in the Sinuiju
Law. The Development Regulations provide considerable de-
tails as well.
The law also provides that South Korean or foreign workers
will not be subject to arrest, detention or search without legal
basis.55 Some analysts are critical that this provision could be
interpreted to mean that as long as a government action is legal
according to North Korean law, an arrest or search can take
place.56 But this type of provision is quite standard in criminal
law for most countries. The central issue of course that has yet
to be decided is what would be the legal basis for allowing an
arrest, detention or search.
Finally, goods that enter the Zone or leave the Zone des-
tined for other countries will be tariff free.57 Goods that are im-
ported into the Zone and then directly sold to another region
within DPRK, however, could be subject to duties. It remains
uncertain if a good made in the Zone that later gets sold to an-
other region in DPRK will receive duty-free treatment as well. 58
The Law also addresses essential issues related to travel and
communications. Article 28, for instance, provides that persons
with a travel permit from the appropriate authority can travel
between South Korea and Gaeseong along designated routes
without a visa. Some critics, however, hold that although this
53. Id. art. 41.
54. MOJ, supra note 2, at 46.
55. Gaeseong Law, art. 8.
56. MOJ, supra note 2, at 27-28 (suggesting that similar provisions that were
adopted for KEDO are needed).
57. Gaeseong Law, art. 33.
58. MOJ, supra note 2, at 39.
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provision appears like a concession, in reality, a travel permit re-
quirement differs little from a visa requirement.5" Therefore,
some experts suggest that even the travel permit should not be
required. In another significant step, freedom to use mail and
telecommunications is also granted.6"
Interestingly, unlike the Sinuiju Law, the Gaeseong Law has
its own provision covering dispute settlement. The dispute set-
tlement provisions of the law provide for consultation if differ-
ences of opinion arise between parties.6 1 If consultations are un-
successful, the parties are supposed to resort to "arbitration or
court procedures" or the "commercial dispute settlement proce-
dures" that have been negotiated but have not yet taken effect
between South and North Korea. It remains uncertain whether
"the arbitration or court procedures" are limited to North Ko-
rean "arbitration or court procedures" or whether they include
"arbitration or court procedures" of other countries.6 2
Since the adoption of the Law, North Korea has enacted a
host of new implementing regulations to supplement the Gaese-
ong Law. These implementing provisions are not only expansive
in their scope but also considerable in their detail. They have
been thoroughly negotiated with counterparts in the ROK and
provide the greatest amount of legal infrastructure that has de-
veloped between the two countries. The Company Establish-
ment and Management Regulations that were established in
June 2003, for example, contain provisions covering the invest-
ment period and manner, management conditions, capital re-
quirements, issuance of bonds, accounting, profit distribution
and liquidation.
The Tax Regulations also adopted on September 18, 2003
confirm that the corporate income tax for the companies operat-
ing in the Zone will be held at 14%.63 In contrast, special eco-
nomic zones in China have corporate taxes between 14% to
24%, in Vietnam between 10% to 25%, and in Hong Kong at
59. Id. at 29.
60. Gaeseong Law, art. 29.
61. Id. art. 46.
62. MOJ, supra note 2, at 48; Kwang Rok Kim, Settling Business Disputes with North
Koreans in the Advent of the External Economic Arbitration Law, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW 401
(2003).
63. Gaeseong Law, art. 43; Tax Regulations, art. 31.
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16%.64 Given the enormous security risks associated with North
Korea, the income tax should perhaps be lowered even further.
Similarly, the Labor Regulations that were announced at
the same time provide that the minimum wage for North Korean
laborers will be set at US$50 and that social insurance must be
15% of the minimum wage or US$7.50 per month. It remains
unclear, however, what the wage rate will be for the advanced
skilled workers that North Korea cannot provide. 65 The regula-
tions also provide that the tax must be in U.S. dollars. These
standards represent significant reforms because North Korean
officials are typically directly involved in the labor conditions
and wage payments of laborers. In principle, all laborers must
be North Korean. Only after consultation can certain manage-
ment positions, technicians or specialists from ROK or other
countries be used.6 6
North Korea also plans to enact similar detailed implement-
ing provisions concerning entry and stay of ROK laborers, the
transfer of materials, accounting, foreign currency, customs, ad-
vertising, and real estate.6 7 Other areas such as the basic rights
of freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of
travel should be explicitly added in a similar fashion to that of
the Sinuiju Law.68
Some observers believe that despite the persistent demands
of ROK, the various laws that DPRK has adopted as part of its
desperate drive to revive its economy, remain unsatisfactory.6 9
From this perspective, the North Korean government has not
taken a sufficient enough role. Forms of social overhead capital,
for instance, water, telecommunications and electricity, still re-
main woefully inadequate for the zone. Also, more detailed im-
plementing provisions for many other areas remain undeter-
mined.
64. The Geumgangsan Law provides for tax-free treatment for tourism develop-
ment and sales activities by the developers in the Zone. Geumgangsan Law, art. 8; See
MOJ, supra note 2, at 71.
65. Cho, supra note 9, at 147.
66. Gaeseong Law, art. 37.
67. See Kyo Jun Ihn, Gaesung Gongdan Segeum Mit Nodong Gyujeong Uimi [The Mean-
ing of the Tax and Labor Regulations in Gaesung Industrial Complex], YONRAPNEWS, Oct. 1,
2003.
68. See MOJ, supra note 2, at 31.
69. Id. at 59.
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite being in their nascent stages, North Korea's recent
initiatives in Sinuiju and Gaeseong herald a new beginning for
North Korea's future, in terms of adopting a market-based eco-
nomic system. This Essay has analyzed the general background
and legal structure of the recently established Sinuiju Special Ad-
ministrative Region and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. Ko-
rea's efforts to develop Sinuiju and particularly Gaeseong also
signify how desperate their situation presently stands.
A vast number of issues and problems remain under the
current legal regimes for both Sinuiju and Gaeseong. First and
foremost, North Korea's relations with South Korea, China and
the United States must improve for them to suade jittery inves-
tors and to have any chance of success in attracting foreign capi-
tal. International support remains just as critical. To properly
develop, DPRK must receive much-needed aid from interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund or the Asian Development Bank. A critical fac-
tor for the success of these legal reforms remains the faithful and
neutral implementation of the laws. Only this type of rule by law
can restore North Korea's credibility and help attract capital and
trade. Finally, other potential means to promote investment in
North Korea other than equity financing such as public and
commercial loans, foreign bonds, and project finance, must be
thoroughly pursued.
